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I. INTRODUCTION
Section 7 of the Clayton Act was intended to arrest the anticompetitive
effects of market power in their incipiency. The core question is
whether a merger may substantially lessen competition, and necessarily
requires a prediction of the merger’s impact on competition, present
and future. The section can deal only with probabilities, not with
certainties. And there is certainly no requirement that the
anticompetitive power manifest itself in anticompetitive action before §
7 can be called into play. If the enforcement of § 7 turned on the
existence of actual anticompetitive practices, the congressional policy
1
of thwarting such practices in their incipiency would be frustrated.

In this Article, we review the proposed $39 billion merger between
AT&T and T-Mobile under federal merger law, under the United States
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”)’s
2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, and with a focus on possible remedies.
We find, under a rule of law approach, that the proposed acquisition is
presumptively anticompetitive, and the merging parties in their public
disclosures have failed to overcome this presumption. Next, we find that
under the Merger Guidelines, there is reason to believe that the transaction
may result in higher prices to consumers under several different plausible
theories. Finally, we turn to the question of possible remedies. We
conclude that there is a high likelihood that divestitures will not solve the
competitive problems and make the case for enjoining the acquisition.

1.

FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 577 (1967) (citations omitted).
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On August 31, 2011, the United States brought an action to enjoin the
2
merger. The government’s complaint was subsequently amended to
3
include the claims of seven states and Puerto Rico as coplaintiffs. Two
competitors also filed suit to enjoin the transaction and the defendants
4
unsuccessfully moved to dismiss their complaints. The government’s case
5
is scheduled to go to trial on February 13, 2012.

II. STANDARD FOR EVALUATING THE MERGER
The starting point for any evaluation is the statute itself. Section 7 of
the Clayton Act prohibits mergers and acquisitions when the effect of the
transaction “may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create
6
a monopoly.”
Contemporary merger law is forward looking. Courts are called upon
to make judgments about the likely effects of a merger that has not yet
taken place. Uncertainty and errors of both overenforcement and
underenforcement are inevitable. Some observers counsel for lenient
merger review, as they believe the market will invariably correct any
mistakes because new firms will enter and market power will quickly
disappear. But the lessons from the financial crisis call into question these
7
8
empirically suspect beliefs. Markets do not always self-correct. Most
2. Complaint, United States v. AT&T, Inc. (2011), No. 11-01560, available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f274600/274613.htm. When we wrote and posted this
article on SSRN, the DOJ was still investigating the merger.
3. Second Amended Complaint, United States v. AT&T, Inc. (2011), No. 11-01560,
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f275700/275756.pdf [hereinafter Compl.].
4. Cecilia Kang, Judge Allows Sprint Suit Against AT&T’s Merger With T-Mobile,
WASH. POST (Nov. 3, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-tech/post/ judgeallows-sprint-suit-against-atandts-merger-with-t-mobile/2011/11/03/gIQATxT5iM_blog.ht
ml?wprss=post-tech. Although the complaints by Sprint and C Spire (formerly Cellular
South) were not dismissed, they were significantly pared down by the court. Michael J. De
La Merced, AT&T Moves to Dismiss Lawsuits by Sprint and Cellular South, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK, Sept. 30, 2011, http://dealbook.nytimes.com /2011/09/30/att-moves-to-dismisslawsuits-by-sprint-and-cell-south/#sprint.
5. Rachel King, AT&T Antitrust Case Gets February Trial Date, CNET NEWS (Sept.
22, 2011, 7:46 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1035_3-20110079-94/at-t-antitrust-casegets-february-trial-date/.
6. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006).
7. See RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ’08 AND THE
DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION (2009); PAUL KRUGMAN, THE RETURN OF DEPRESSION
ECONOMICS AND THE CRISIS OF 2008 (2009).
8. See, e.g., KENNETH M. DAVIDSON, REALITY IGNORED: HOW MILTON FRIEDMAN
AND CHICAGO ECONOMICS UNDERMINED AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS AND ENDANGERED THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY (2011); JOHN CASSIDY, HOW MARKETS FAIL: THE LOGIC OF ECONOMIC
CALAMITIES 59 (2009); JUSTIN FOX, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL MARKET: A HISTORY OF
RISK, REWARD, AND DELUSION ON WALL STREET (2009); GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J.
SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: HOW HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY DRIVES THE ECONOMY, AND WHY IT
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mergers do not yield significant efficiencies (which, if they did, would
9
warrant a light touch approach to merger review).
Instead, in the current era of Too-Big-and-Integral-to-Fail, we can see
how Congress in the aftermath of World War II got it right. In amending
the Clayton Act, Congress saw the dangers of concentrated economic and
10
political power, and sought to arrest these threats in their incipiency.
Thus, when evaluating mergers, the enforcers and the courts should respect
Congress’s desires and err, if anything, on the side of enforcement.
Enforcement under the Clayton Act must also consider whether there is a
trend toward concentration. “Long-term trends in HHI changes,” the Fifth
Circuit recently noted, “can be used to examine the structure of markets
11
and are used to determine the effect of mergers on the market.” Where
the market trends show that the merging parties “have been the dominant
players in the relevant markets and do not indicate any trend of reduced
12
concentration . . . ,” then a merger should be enjoined. An immediate
13
danger of monopolization is not needed for a merger to be unlawful.
The merger law, by its own language and Congress’s intent, requires
heightened scrutiny of mergers, especially those in already concentrated

MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM (2009); John Cassidy, Letter from Chicago: After the
Blowup, NEW YORKER, Jan. 11, 2010, at 28, available at http://www.new
yorker.com/reporting/2010/01/11/100111fa_fact_cassidy; Paul Krugman, How Did
Economists Get It So Wrong?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2009, at 37, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2009/09/06/magazine/06Economic-t.html?pagewanted=all (noting that
more important than the economists’ failure to predict was “the profession’s blindness to the
very possibility of catastrophic failures in a market economy”).
9. See, e.g., Amanda P. Reeves & Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Antitrust, 86 IND.
L.J. 1527, 1560–63 (2011); Spencer Weber Waller, Corporate Governance and Competition
Policy, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 833, 873–79 (2011) (examining evidence from corporate
finance that suggests entire categories of mergers are more likely to destroy, rather than
enhance, shareholder value); Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Economists at the Gate:
Antitrust in the Twenty-First Century, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 513, 573–75 (2007).
10. As the Court noted about the 1950 amendments to the Clayton Act, it was
“apparent that a keystone in the erection of a barrier to what Congress saw was the rising
tide of economic concentration, was its provision of authority for arresting mergers at a time
when the trend to a lessening of competition in a line of commerce was still in its
incipiency.” Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 347 (1962). The Court noted,
“[t]hat § 7 of the Clayton Act was intended to reach incipient monopolies and trade
restraints outside the scope of the Sherman Act was explicitly stated in the Senate Report on
the original Act . . . . This theme was reiterated in congressional consideration of the
amendments adopted in 1950, and found expression in the final House and Senate Reports
on the measure.” Id. at 347 n.32 (citation omitted).
11. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. N.V. v. FTC, 534 F.3d 410, 432 n.12 (5th Cir. 2008).
12. Id.
13. Robert H. Lande, Resurrecting Incipiency: From Von's Grocery to Consumer
Choice, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 875 (2001).
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industries with entry barriers.14 Thus, the outcome for merger review
should significantly differ than the outcome for evaluating antitrust
restraints generally under the Sherman Act.

III. THIS MERGER IS PRESUMPTIVELY ANTICOMPETITIVE
Under well-established U.S. law, there is a strong presumption of
illegality when the merging firms’ market shares are significant in an
industry with high entry barriers. As the Supreme Court said,
[A] merger which produces a firm controlling an undue percentage
share of the relevant market, and results in a significant increase in the
concentration of firms in that market is so inherently likely to lessen
competition substantially that it must be enjoined in the absence of
evidence clearly showing that the merger is not likely to have such
15
anticompetitive effects.”

Consistent with the legislative intent of the Clayton Act, courts have
regarded a transaction that would lead to further concentration in an already
16
highly concentrated market as presumptively illegal under Section 7. In
United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, the Court held that a merger
resulting in a single firm controlling thirty percent of a market trending
toward concentration in which four firms controlled seventy percent of the
17
sales was presumptively illegal. Unless the merging parties “meet their
18
burden of rebutting this presumption, the merger must be enjoined.” That
14. See United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363–68 (1963).
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., United States v. Cont’l Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 461 (1964); United States
v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271, 278, 280 (1964); FTC v. Swedish Match, 131
F. Supp. 2d 151 (D.D.C. 2000); FTC. v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 53
(D.D.C. 1998) (finding that “[r]egardless of how one were to define the relevant drug
wholesale market, whether it would include business to all or only some of its customers,
the merged firms would control a significant share of all of the markets.”); United States v.
Ivaco, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 1409, 1419 (W.D. Mich. 1989). Measures of concentration have
changed over the years. For the past three decades, the antitrust agencies have used the
“Herfindahl-Hirschman Index” or HHI. HHI is calculated by summing the squares of the
market shares of all firms in the industry. In doing so, it gives greater weight to the market
shares of larger firms than the shares of smaller firms, reflecting the fact that larger firms are
generally more competitively significant. Prior measures of concentration merely added the
market shares of the industry’s largest companies. Thus, the “four firm concentration ratio”
is the sum of the market shares of the four largest firms in an industry.
17. 374 U.S. at 364 (“Without attempting to specify the smallest market share which
would still be considered to threaten undue concentration, we are clear that 30% presents
that threat.”). Subsequent cases have lowered the presumption somewhat to even twentyfive percent or less. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271, 275
(1964) (aggregate market share 29.1%; acquired firm's market share 1.3%; four-firm
concentration ratio 76%).
18. R.C. Bigelow, Inc. v. Unilever N.V., 867 F.2d 102, 108 (2d Cir. 1989); see also
Swedish Match, 131 F. Supp. 2d at 151; Cmty. Publishers, Inc. v. Donrey Corp., 892 F.
Supp. 1146 (W.D. Ark. 1995), aff’d 139 F.3d 1180 (8th Cir. 1998).
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presumption applies to the AT&T/T-Mobile merger in an already highly
concentrated industry with high-entry barriers.

A.

AT&T’s Postmerger Market Share Would Exceed Forty Percent

The candidate product market is the market for “mobile wireless
19
telecommunications services.” This was the market definition used in
20
prior DOJ cases such as United States v. AT&T Inc. and United States v.
21
Verizon Communications Inc. In those cases, DOJ noted that there were
no cost-effective alternatives to mobile wireless telecommunications
services, and it is unlikely that a sufficient number of customers would
switch away from mobile wireless telecommunications services to make a
small but significant nontransitory price increase in those services
22
unprofitable.
This candidate product market includes voice, text messaging, and
data services. The data component of mobile wireless services has been
rapidly growing in the past few years. There has been a high smartphone
adoption and upgrade rate (close to fifty percent in 2009 according to the
23
FCC’s Fourteenth Mobile Wireless Competition Report). There has also
been an expansion in the number of non-smartphone handsets that are
subject to mandatory data plans. Data plans for mobile phones are typically
sold as part of a bundle. At the end of the day, DOJ’s product market
candidate, which includes voice, messaging, and data, is defensible.
The candidate geographic markets include both local and national
24
markets. Historically, viewed from the consumer perspective, geographic
25
markets were local. This was because consumers purchasing mobile
wireless telecommunications services chose among the providers that
offered services where they lived, worked, and traveled on a regular
19. This is the product market alleged by the United States in its complaint. See
Compl. at 7.
20. Complaint at 1, United States v. AT&T Inc., 541 F. Supp. 2d 2 (D.D.C. 2008)
(No. 1:07-cv-01952), http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f227300/227306.pdf [hereinafter
AT&T Compl.].
21. Complaint at 1, United States v. Verizon Comm. Inc., 607 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C.
2009)
(No.
1:08-cv-00993),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f233900/233928.pdf
[hereinafter Verizon Compl.].
22. See, e.g., AT&T Compl., supra note 20, at 2; Verizon Compl., supra note 21, at 2.
23. Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1993, Fourteenth Report, 25 F.C.C.R. 11407, para. 137, Chart 6 (WTB 2010),
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-10-81A1.pdf [hereinafter 14th
Mobile Wireless Competition Report].
24.
Compl., supra note 3, at 9–12 (evaluating competition both at local level and
nationwide competition across local markets).
25. Id. at 10.
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basis.26 Historically, providers offered different promotions, discounts,
calling plans, and equipment subsidies in different geographic areas,
27
varying the price for customers by geographic area.
By the end of 2008, however, there were four facilities-based mobile
wireless service providers that industry observers typically described as
28
“nationwide”: AT&T, Sprint Nextel, T-Mobile, and Verizon Wireless. In
2008, all the nationwide operators launched unlimited national flat-rate
29
calling plans. Consumers increasingly have shifted away from restricted
plans that included separate roaming charges and into these unlimited
service options, and the focus of price competition has shifted
30
accordingly. It now appears that pricing is for the most part set nationally
by the four nationwide carriers, and regional and local competitors do not
act as significant constraints on national pricing.
31
Indeed, in its FCC public interest statements in both the Dobson and
32
Centennial acquisitions, AT&T acknowledged that the geographic market
is national precisely for these reasons. As AT&T wrote in its Centennial
statement, supported by a declaration from its Chief Marketing Officer,
“[i]n the mainland U.S., AT&T establishes its rate plans and pricing on a
national basis, without reference to market structure at the [Cellular Market
33
Area] level.” AT&T’s statement continues: “One of AT&T’s objectives
is to develop its rate plans, features and prices in response to competitive
conditions and offerings at the national levels [sic]—primarily the plans
34
offered by the other national carriers.”
Although pricing by the four nationwide operators appears to be
largely national, there may be promotions or discounts (e.g., handset
discounts) that occur on a local basis. At trial, the court will likely consider
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 9.
See, e.g., AT&T Compl., supra note 20; Compl., supra note 3, at 9.
14th Mobile Wireless Competition Report, supra note 23, at para. 27.
Id. at para. 88.
Id. at para. 90.
AT&T, MERGER OF AT&T INC. AND DOBSON COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION,
DESCRIPTION OF TRANSACTION, PUBLIC INTEREST SHOWING AND RELATED DEMONSTRATIONS
(July 13, 2007) (filed with the FCC), available at https://wireless2.fcc.gov/UlsEntry
/attachments/attachmentViewRD.jsp?applType=search&fileKey=688206512&attachmentK
ey=18223538&attachmentInd=applAttach.
32. AT&T, MERGER OF AT&T INC. AND CENTENNIAL COMMUNICATIONS CORP.,
DESCRIPTION OF TRANSACTION, PUBLIC INTEREST SHOWING AND RELATED DEMONSTRATIONS
(Nov. 21, 2008) (filed with the FCC), available at https://wireless2.fcc.gov/UlsEntry/
attachments/attachmentViewRD.jsp;ATTACHMENTS=1N6VJL5K37mPzN1G7L2XKBP7
mC5jC50m96ttqVlHZr3GL1cyJSgx!-659400886!-849295342?applType=search&fileKey
=843683410&attachmentKey=18355849&attachmentInd=applAttach.
33. Id. at 28.
34. Id.at 28–29.
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how much of these promotions and discounts are driven by competition.
The court will also consider how big a factor the local promotions and
discounts play in the overall pricing picture of AT&T, T-Mobile, Verizon,
and Sprint. For example, if a two-year wireless plan costs $1200 per year,
but there is a fifty dollar discount available in some cities on a new phone,
that would amount to about a two percent discount over two years and
would probably be small enough not to undercut the overall national
pricing picture.
Viewed from the standpoint of business customers, where travel
capabilities are important and contracts are negotiated, the same conclusion
appears likely: the geographic market is national. Similarly, viewed from
the standpoint of suppliers (e.g., handset manufacturers), the geographic
market is undoubtedly national. It is interesting to note that, according to an
AT&T executive, Apple apparently approached Verizon, Sprint, AT&T,
35
and T-Mobile about the original iPhone.
Consequently, under this proposed market definition, the merging
parties will have a significant market share. As Senator Herbert Kohl
observed at the recent hearings on this merger, “The proposed merger
between AT&T and T-Mobile will bring together two of the four remaining
national cell phone carriers to create the nation’s largest cell phone
network, with an estimated 43% market share. Should this deal be
approved, AT&T and Verizon will control close to 80% of the national cell
36
phone market.” Under the Merger Guidelines, the merger would
significantly increase concentration in the already concentrated national
37
market and in ninety-seven of the top one hundred local markets.

B.

Entry Barriers Are High

Entry into the market of mobile wireless telecommunications services
requires either (a) building out a network and obtaining spectrum rights, a
slow process with high capital costs, or (b) piggy-backing on an existing
provider, which is quicker but potentially more constrained (since network
access, contract terms, and growth are all subject to a competitor’s
38
willingness to contract).
35. See Lafayette Policy Studies Program, Jacoby Lecture, YOUTUBE, 17:50 (April 11,
2011), http://www.youtube.com/user/lafayettepolicystds#p/u/0/j6Pqp40rigo.
36. Press Release, Senator Herb Kohl, Statement of U.S. Senator Herb Kohl on the
AT&T/T-Mobile Merger (May, 11, 2011), http://kohl.senate.gov/newsroom/pressrelease
.cfm?customel_dataPageID_1464=4452.
37. Compl., supra note 3, at 12–14.
38. See 14th Mobile Wireless Competition Report, supra note 23, at paras. 60
(facilities based entry), 36, n.91 (mobile virtual network operators); Compl. at 21 (“To
replace the competition that would be lost from AT&T’s elimination of T-Mobile as an
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The inputs necessary to enter include spectrum, towers, network
equipment, and backhaul facilities. We doubt there can be a serious claim
that entry is easy. Moreover, as Tim Wu discusses in his book, The Master
Switch, there is apparently reason to be skeptical of AT&T’s willingness to
39
grant competitors reasonable access to its network.

C.

The Incipiency Standard

For the past thirty years or so, DOJ has looked at deals one at a time,
40
and has not made use of Section 7’s “incipiency” standard, which
41
requires the antitrust enforcers to nip concentration in the bud. Nor has
DOJ examined trends toward concentration, and the likely impact that such
concentration would have on the overall competitiveness of an industry.
The 2010 revisions to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines have changed this
approach. The Merger Guidelines now refer to the Congressional intent
“that merger enforcement should interdict competitive problems in their
incipiency and that certainty about anticompetitive effect is seldom
42
possible and not required for a merger to be illegal.”
Indeed, ignoring the Clayton Act’s incipiency standard raises
significant rule-of-law concerns. Congress, in passing Section 7 and in
amending it with the Celler-Kefauver Anti-Merger Amendments, “was
concerned with arresting concentration in the American economy, whatever
43
its cause, in its incipiency.” To halt the “‘rising tide’ of concentration in
American business,” Congress decided “‘to clamp down with vigor on

independent competitor, moreover, a new entrant would need to have nationwide spectrum,
a national network, scale economies that arise from having tens of millions of customers,
and a strong brand, as well as other valued characteristics.”).
39. TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES
245–49 (2011).
40. A search of the DOJ Antitrust Division website produced a few court cases where
the United States mentioned the incipiency standard including some recent instances. See
Plaintiffs’ Proposed Conclusions of Law, United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d.
1098 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (No. C 04-0807 VRW), www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f204500/204558
.pdf; Plaintiff United States of America’s Motion to Strike Defendants' Efficiencies
Defense, United States v. Northwest Airlines Corp., No. 98-74611 (E.D. Mich. 2000),
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f4500/4542.htm; Memorandum of United
States in Support of Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and a Preliminary
Injunction, United States v. Franklin Electric Co., 130 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (W.D. Wisc. 2000),
www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f4800/4883.pdf.
41. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 589, 593 (1957).
42. U.S. Dep’t of Justice & FTC, Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 1 (2010), available
at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.html [hereinafter 2010 Horizontal
Merger Guidelines].
43. United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 552 (1966).
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mergers.’”44 Congress’s premise was that mergers tend to accelerate
concentration in an industry:
The use of these words [“may be”] means that the bill, if enacted,
would not apply to the mere possibility but only to the reasonable
probability of the prescribed [sic] effect * * *. The words ‘may be’
have been in section 7 of the Clayton Act since 1914. The concept of
reasonable probability conveyed by these words is a necessary element
in any statute which seeks to arrest restraints of trade in their
incipiency and before they develop into full-fledged restraints violative
of the Sherman Act. A requirement of certainty and actuality of injury
to competition is incompatible with any effort to supplement the
45
Sherman Act by reaching incipient restraints.

With the rise of the Chicago School in the late 1970s, it became
fashionable among antitrust economists and lawyers to dismiss the
incipiency standard as outdated. Before the financial crisis, the
conventional wisdom was that antitrust enforcers and courts could (and
should) use concentration only as a screen: the antitrust agencies would
challenge only those few mergers that, under the prevailing economic
46
thinking, would demonstrably lead to a postmerger price increase. It
came to the point where the agencies seemed obligated not only to prove
that a merger would cause prices to rise postmerger, but also explain the
chain of events that would lead to the postmerger price increase (either
unilateral or coordinated effects) and the likely magnitude of the price
47
increase.
It is difficult to imagine how a DOJ or FTC attorney, even one with
an MBA, could be expected to meet this burden. For some industries,
anticompetitive effects may be relatively easy to predict; but in other
industries, making such predictions is a fool’s errand. The merging parties’
documents may be useful, but repeat players before the agencies can be
expected to know what to put into, and what to leave out of, their planning
documents. Indeed, any well-counseled firm that plans to continue to grow
through mergers knows this lesson very well.
The revised Merger Guidelines now state, in discussing coordinated
effects, that this level of predictive causation is not called for: “Pursuant to

44. Id. at 552 (quoting United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 276 (1966)).
45. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 n.39 (1962) (quoting Senator
Reed from the Congressional Record).
46. Lawrence M. Frankel, The Flawed Institutional Design of U.S. Merger Review:
Stacking the Deck Against Enforcement, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 159, 159 (2008).
47. See, e.g., United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1165 (N.D. Cal.
2004) (misconstruing the Clayton Act’s incipiency standard, the trial court held that
“[w]ithout the benefit of presumptions, the burden remains upon plaintiffs to come forward
with evidence of actual anticompetitive effects.”).
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the Clayton Act’s incipiency standard, the Agencies may challenge mergers
that in their judgment pose a real danger of harm through coordinated
effects, even without specific evidence showing precisely how the
48
coordination likely would take place.”
This recognition does much to bring the agencies back into line with
the law. Congress and the courts have recognized that some economists and
lawyers might believe that the disappearance of smaller competitors and
greater industry concentration are bound to occur whether mergers are
49
prohibited or not. But this is not their decision to make. As the Supreme
Court noted, “it is not for the courts to review the policy decision of
Congress that mergers which may substantially lessen competition are
forbidden, which in effect the courts would be doing should they now
require proof of the congressional premise that mergers are a major cause
50
of concentration.” Nor should it be left to the whim of the particular court
or agency official to decide whether a trend toward concentration in an
industry, whatever its causes, is a relevant factor in deciding whether the
merger violates the Clayton Act. Congress determined that the trend toward
concentration is a highly relevant factor.
Under the incipiency standard, the AT&T/T-Mobile merger is highly
problematic. The typical local market for mobile wireless services is
already highly concentrated and the trend prior to this acquisition has been
51
toward greater concentration. The FCC states that concentration has
increased thirty-two percent since 2003 and six and a half percent in the
52
most recent year for which data is available. The weighted average HHI
(weighted by “Economic Area” population which is an aggregation of
counties including the “node” and the surrounding areas economically
53
related to the node) was 2848 in 2008, an increase from 2674 in 2007.
The weighted average HHI has increased by nearly 700 since the FCC first
54
calculated this metric in 2003. On a national basis, the trend toward
concentration is equally apparent.
To see the impact of the incipiency standard on merger review, take
as an example Aluminum Company of America’s acquisition of a small
48. 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 42, § 7.1.
49. United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 552 (1966) (noting how
“[m]any believe . . . that the disappearance of small businesses with a correlative
concentration of business in the hands of a few is bound to occur whether mergers are
prohibited or not.”).
50. Id.
51. Compl., supra note 3, at paras. 22–23.
52. See 14th Mobile Wireless Competition Report, supra note 23, at 6.
53. See id. at 15; as to how HHIs are calculated, see supra note 16.
54. See 14th Mobile Wireless Competition Report, supra note 23, at 15.
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competitor, Rome Cable Corporation.55 The Court noted that the
acquisition gave the dominant firm Alcoa only 1.3% additional control of
56
the aluminum conductor line market. Indeed, although Rome was an
aggressive competitor, it was unlikely that Alcoa could significantly
57
increase its market power. If the agencies or courts ignored the incipiency
standard and required proof of the specific anticompetitive effects
postmerger, then the dominant firms could acquire their smaller rivals one
at a time, notwithstanding the federal antitrust law. It is unlikely that DOJ
could prove why and how prices would increase as a result of this merger,
or the magnitude of the price increase. But this standard, besides being
unrealistic, contravenes the legislative intent. In the Alcoa-Rome Cable
merger, the Court did not ramble through the wilds of economic theory.
Instead, the Court turned to the statute and its legislative history: the
Committee Reports on Section 7 show, with respect to the Celler-Kefauver
Amendments in 1950, that “the objective was to prevent accretions of
power which ‘are individually so minute as to make it difficult to use the
58
Sherman Act test against them.’” Thus, under the incipiency standard,
“[i]t would seem that the situation in the aluminum industry may be
oligopolistic. As that condition develops, the greater is the likelihood that
parallel policies of mutual advantage, not competition, will emerge. That
tendency may well be thwarted by the presence of small but significant
59
competitors.” While, for some, Alcoa may be an extreme example, it
60
illustrates a valid point. Incipiency is not a novel concept for the courts.

55. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am, 377 U.S. 271, 272–73 (1964).
56. Id. at 273–74 (finding that Rome in the year prior to the merger produced “0.3%
of total industry production of bare aluminum conductor, 4.7% of insulated aluminum
conductor, and 1.3% of the broader aluminum conductor line.”). That same year, Alcoa
“produced 32.5% of the bare aluminum conductor, 11.6% of insulated aluminum conductor,
and 27.8% of aluminum conductor.” Id. at 274; see also id. at 280 (“The acquisition of
Rome added, it is said, only 1.3% to Alcoa's control of the aluminum conductor market.”).
57. The Court was clearly concerned about the trend toward concentration. It noted
how “[i]t would seem that the situation in the aluminum industry may be oligopolistic.” Id.
at 280. The Court was concerned of the “likelihood that parallel policies of mutual
advantage, not competition, will emerge” in this industry. Id. This trend toward oligopoly,
observed the Court “may well be thwarted by the presence of small but significant
competitors.” Id. (emphasis added). Moreover, the evidentiary record showed that Rome
“was an aggressive competitor.” Id. at 281.
58. Id. at 280 (citations omitted).
59. Id.
60. Section 8 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits interlocking directorates, also
employs an incipiency standard. Courts have long recognized that the purpose behind
Section 8 was “to nip in the bud incipient violations of the antitrust laws by removing the
opportunity or temptation to such violations through interlocking directorates.” United
States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 111 F. Supp. 614, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
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Indeed, the incipiency standard places antitrust on surer footing under
rule of law principles, than having the agencies or generalist courts trying
to predict what in many industries is unpredictable. As the Court has long
61
recognized, the relevant economic data are “both complex and elusive.”
If the legality of a merger rises and falls on the ability of the agencies to
prove the nature and magnitude of the postmerger anticompetitive effects,
then business executives will not know which mergers would likely be
blocked. Such a vague, fact-specific rule of reason analysis would benefit
antitrust lawyers and economists (and data production teams to comply
with the onerous Second Request for “additional information and
62
documentary material relevant to the proposed acquisition.”). But merger
law is now nothing more than haphazard merger predictions, which raises
significant rule-of-law concerns, “[a]nd unless businessmen can assess the
legal consequences of a merger with some confidence, sound business
63
planning is retarded.” Under the current incipiency standard and
presumption, the merging parties (and antitrust agencies to the extent they
permit such mergers to go through) must produce evidence clearly showing
64
that the merger is unlikely to have anticompetitive effects. The evidence
should be so clear that citizens and Congress are confident that the risks
inherent in the transaction are insignificant, and the procompetitive benefits
65
are significant. If the merging parties (and antitrust agencies) fail to
overcome this presumption, then there is little confidence that the law is
being enforced as it should be.
The Philadelphia National Bank presumption is not only consistent
with congressional intent (in preventing a too broad of an economic
investigation), but it provides firms, especially those in concentrated
industries, some guidance as to whether they or their competitors can
merge (without running afoul of the Clayton Act). Indeed, it can re-channel
61. United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362 (1963).
62. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(e)(1)(A) (2000).
63. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 362.
64. See, e.g., Christian Schmidt Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc., 600
F. Supp. 1326, 1330 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (“In evaluating this evidence, [courts] must keep in
mind the Supreme Court's instruction that a merger which produces a firm with an undue
market share and significantly increases concentration in the industry ‘is so inherently likely
to lessen competition substantially that it must be enjoined in the absence of evidence
clearly showing that the merger is not likely to have such anti-competitive effects.’”)
(quoting United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (emphasis added
by district court), aff'd, 753 F.2d 1354 (6th Cir. 1985).
65. See, e.g., Tasty Baking Co. v. Ralston Purina, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 1250, 1264 (E.D.
Pa. 1987) (defendants can overcome presumption with significant evidence “that the
market-share statistics g[i]ve an inaccurate account of the acquisition['s] probable effects on
competition”) (quoting United States v. Citizens & Southern National Bank, 422 U.S. 86,
120 (1975)).
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some of the wasted costs in lobbying policymakers66 (and fees to
investment bankers) that arise from merger waves. Knowing that the
merger is presumptively illegal, and knowing that the evidentiary showing
to overcome this presumption is significant, many large firms in
concentrated industries recognize that neither they nor their significant
competitors can further increase industry concentration with another
merger. This can increase their incentives to grow organically through
superior internal efficiencies, technologies, services, and offerings.
Consequently, under well-established U.S. law, there is a strong
presumption of illegality when the merging firm’s market share exceeds
thirty percent in a highly concentrated industry with high entry barriers. As
we examine below, the merging parties (through their public disclosures at
least) have not overcome this strong presumption of illegality.

IV. THE MERGING PARTIES HAVE NOT OVERCOME THE
PRESUMPTION OF ILLEGALITY
A.

The Merging Parties Have Not Established That Consumers
Will Overall Benefit with Merger Specific Efficiencies

“Although the Supreme Court has not sanctioned the use of the
efficiencies defense in a section 7 merger case, the trend among lower
67
courts is to recognize the defense.” Based on the publicly available
information, it is unlikely that AT&T will overcome this presumption of
anti-competitive harm with an efficiencies defense. Instead we find: (i)
many of the efficiencies that AT&T claims are not “merger specific” and
thus not “cognizable” under the agencies’ Horizontal Merger Guidelines,
and (ii) to obtain efficiencies in one part of the merged company (i.e., on
the AT&T side), the company will need to cause harm somewhere else
(i.e., on the T-Mobile side).
The merger does not really expand wireless coverage area for
customers. Apparently the coverage profiles of AT&T and T-Mobile are
fairly similar, so it is unlikely that combining the companies will create
68
significant improvements in coverage area. The latest buzz is 4G wireless
technologies, which offer theoretical download speeds of 100 Mbps, with
the technology based on orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing

66. See Maurice E. Stucke, Crony Capitalism and Antitrust, CPI ANTITRUST
CHRONICLE (forthcoming 2011) (discussing AT&T and T-Mobile’s lobbying efforts to gain
approval of their merger) (abstract available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1942045).
67. FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 720 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).
68. See Jessica Dolcourt, AT&T and T-Mobile: By the Numbers, CNET (Mar. 20,
2011), http://www.cnet.com/8301-17918_1-20045216-85.html.
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(“OFDM”).69 To the extent that the merger allegedly gives T-Mobile a
“clear path” to 4G services, this is not merger-specific. Just giving
customers of one of the merging parties access to something that the other
party offers is not a merger-specific efficiency. Customers who value that
feature could switch to the other provider absent the merger. Moreover, if
there is evidence that T-Mobile was independently working on the
equivalent of 4G (and there is here), then this undercuts the efficiency
defense. The argument that T-Mobile has “no clear path” towards 4G only
begs the question: in a competitive environment, under the rigors of
70
competition, T-Mobile needs to find such a path. The lack of a “clear
path” is an incentive to innovate and compete harder. The asserted benefit
of the merger, from T-Mobile’s standpoint, is that AT&T can migrate TMobile users to its network. This is not a true efficiency because the choice
is already part of a price-quality tradeoff for consumers.
To the extent that the merger gives AT&T needed spectrum, there are
less anticompetitive alternatives for AT&T to get more spectrum. One
argument in favor of the merger is that AT&T is running out of spectrum as
71
data-hungry users are using what AT&T currently offers. But there are
other ways for AT&T to get needed spectrum that would not harm
competition. The irony should not be lost on anyone that the video and
music needs of a segment of AT&T customers appear to be the driving
force of this merger. In order to satisfy those needs, AT&T is proposing to
restructure the industry.
One efficiency that may be associated with the acquisition is that it
will give the merged firm more spectrum options, which will allow it to
deploy spectrum most efficiently. Not all spectrum is created equally, and
thus there may be benefits to both T-Mobile and AT&T if they are able to
redeploy spectrum. As the FCC noted:
[S]pectrum resources in different frequency bands have distinguishing
features that can make some frequency bands more valuable or better
suited for particular purposes. For instance, given the superior
propagation characteristics of spectrum under 1 GHz, particularly for
providing coverage in rural areas and for penetrating buildings,
69. Marguerite Reardon, Which 4G Service Is Right For You? (FAQ), CNET NEWS
(Dec. 3, 2010, 4:00 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-30686_3-20024511-266.html#
ixzz1Muvdpsuq.
70. References to T-Mobile’s alleged lack of a “clear path” to Long Term Evolution
(“LTE”) appear repeatedly in AT&T’s public interest statement. See AT&T, ACQUISITION
OF T-MOBILE USA, INC. BY AT&T INC.: DESCRIPTION OF TRANSACTION, PUBLIC INTEREST
SHOWING AND RELATED DEMONSTRATIONS 1, 5, 13, 19, 30–32, 41, 43, 71, 102 (Apr. 21,
2011) [hereinafter AT&T SUBMISSION] (filed with the FCC), https://prodnet.www.neca.
org/publicationsdocs/wwpdf/42111att.pdf.
71. See AT&T’s Answer, United States v. AT&T, Inc. (2011), No. 11-01560.
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providers whose spectrum assets include a greater amount of spectrum
below 1 GHz spectrum may possess certain competitive advantages for
providing robust coverage when compared to licensees whose portfolio
is exclusively or primarily comprised of higher frequency spectrum. As
discussed above, holding a mix of frequency ranges may be optimal
from the perspective of providing the greatest service quality at low
cost.

The spectrum holdings in the industry as of 2009 were as follows:72
Percentage Spectrum Holdings, Measured on a MHz POPs Basis by
Provider, by Frequency Band*
(Providers Listed by Number of Subscribers as of 2Q 2009)
Licensee
Verizon
Wireless
AT&T
Sprint Nextel
T-Mobile
MetroPCS
US Cellular
Leap
Other
Clearwire
Grand Total

700
MHz
42.7%

Cellular
SMR
PCS
AWS
BRS
EBS
(850
(800/900 (1.9 GHz) (1.7/2.1 (2.5 GHz)
Leases
MHz)
MHz)
GHz)
(2.5 GHz)
48.5%
0.0%
15.4%
15.0% 0.0%
0.0%

24.3%
0.0%
0.0%
0.5%
2.7%
0.0%
29.8%
0.0%
100.0%

42.3%
0.0%
0.0%**
0.0%
4.3%
0.0%
4.9%
0.0%
100.0%

0.0%
93.0%*
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
7.0%*
0.0%
100.0%

25.9%
26.8%
19.7%
2.6%
1.8%
2.3%
5.5%
0.0%
100.0%

11.2%
0.0%
27.5%
5.9%
2.0%
8.8%
29.6%
0.0%
100.0%

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
13.7%*
86.3%*
100.0%

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
38.0%*
62.0%*
100.0%

* These are estimates based on the available data.
** T-Mobile holds a very small amount of Cellular spectrum.
T-Mobile’s spectrum holdings are almost entirely above 1 GHz. This
suggests, at a minimum, that AT&T’s commitment to build out its network
in rural areas is largely independent of anything it is gaining in the
acquisition. T-Mobile’s spectrum holdings are not well-suited for rural
build-outs. Rather, this promise seems to be politically driven and aimed at
senators and representatives from largely rural states. As a cost of getting
support for the transaction, AT&T is willing to spend more on rural
markets. Merger critics point out that Verizon already plans to cover more
73
than ninety percent of the U.S. population with 4G LTE service by 2013,

72.
14th Mobile Wireless Competition Report, supra note 23, at 148, Table 25.
73.
See Petition to Deny of Public Knowledge and Future of Music Coalition at 59–
60, Applications of AT&T Inc. and Deutsche Telekom AG (No. 11-65) (2011), http://www.
publicknowledge.org/files/docs/pk_fmc-att_tmo-petition_to_deny.pdf.
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and competition, rather than promises, is what is likely to cause AT&T to
74
increase its own coverage.
On the other hand, at least parts of T-Mobile’s spectrum, licenses, and
probably towers are valuable in the urban areas where AT&T is apparently
having network difficulties. The likely argument is that both firms will
benefit by redeployment of assets. Of course, this same argument can be
used whenever firms have to compete for scarce inputs, and no firm wins
all the auctions. Critics have contended that AT&T could take the money it
is spending on the acquisition and spend it on network improvements, and
that would be a more procompetitive outcome.
AT&T’s efficiency argument essentially comes down to this: what is
good for AT&T is good for the United States. It equates its increase in
dominance, and its elimination of a significant competitor, as somehow
proconsumer, proinnovation and proinvestment. AT&T’s lead filing with
the FCC contains dire predictions if its merger is blocked. AT&T predicts
that consumers will confront “lower output, worse quality, and higher
75
prices.” It alleges that preventing its acquisition of T-Mobile would risk
“degrading service for millions of American consumers, undermining the
virtuous cycle of mobile broadband innovation, and imperiling U.S.
76
technological leadership.” It warns that prohibiting its merger will cause
AT&T to have capacity problems, which “could have ripple effects
77
throughout the broadband ecosystem.” It also warns that absent the
merger, consumers would face even “more dropped and blocked calls,
78
slower speeds, and access to fewer and less advanced applications.”
It is entirely rational for AT&T to equate its corporate interests with
America’s interest. Indeed, this attitude suggests that America is already
too dependent upon AT&T, and, thus, must allow the company to grow
even bigger. But this is not the mindset of consumers or society. Rather
what is good for America is good for AT&T. And what is good for
America generally means more, rather than less, competition. If spectrum
is, as AT&T argues, a scarce resource, then all competitors are confronted
with this scarcity. While AT&T argues that dominant firms should grow
bigger by acquiring their competitors’ spectrum, that is not necessarily in
our country’s best interest. Instead, the fundamental belief is that

74. See The Effect of AT&T’s Acquisition of T-Mobile is Likely to Substantially Lessen
Competition, AMERICAN ANTITRUST INSTITUTE, 3 (August 2011), http://www.antitrust
institute.org/~antitrust/sites/default/files/White%20paper.pdf.
75. AT&T SUBMISSION, supra note 70, at 71.
76. Id. at 14.
77. Id. at 62.
78. Id. at 6.
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competition forces companies to better allocate scarce resources.79 AT&T
complains that, unlike its competitors, it supports multiple generations of
technology, and this “severely constrains its flexibility to use its spectrum
80
with optimal efficiency.” AT&T claims that migrating its customers to
81
new handsets takes too much time. But the remedy for AT&T’s dilemma
is not to acquire its competitor to address its own inefficiencies. Instead,
AT&T must do better, and find better ways to innovate to serve its
customers. In a competitive environment, if AT&T falls behind, it risks
losing customers to more nimble competitors. In a less competitive
environment, these customers have correspondingly fewer options.
There is another reason to be wary of AT&T’s belief that what serves
its corporate interests benefits Americans. Notwithstanding its claims of
being an innovation pioneer, AT&T was “the lowest-scoring cell-phone
carrier in the U.S., according to a satisfaction survey of 58,000
82
ConsumerReports.org readers.” Of all the carriers rated, AT&T was the
only one to drop significantly in overall satisfaction. While AT&T points
83
out that it introduced Apple’s iPhone, Consumer Reports recently found
84
“iPhone owners were, by far, the least satisfied” with AT&T.
Given the high market concentration levels and the trend toward
concentration in this case, the lower court case law requires that AT&T and
T-Mobile provide “proof of extraordinary efficiencies, which the [merging
parties] failed to supply . . . . [E]fficiencies almost never justify a merger to
85
monopoly or near-monopoly.” Moreover, given the high concentration
86
87
levels and the business and behavioral economics literature on the
79. See, e.g., William J. Kolasky, What Is Competition? A Comparison of the U.S.
and European Perspectives, 49 ANTITRUST BULL. 29, 35 (2004) (“[C]ompetition is the
process by which market forces operate freely to assure that society's scarce resources are
employed as efficiently as possible to maximize total economic welfare.”); William J.
Kolasky & Andrew R. Dick, The Merger Guidelines and the Integration of Efficiencies into
Antitrust Review of Horizontal Mergers, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 207, 208 (2003) (“The
fundamental reason we favor competition over monopoly is that competition tends to drive
markets to a more efficient use of scarce resources.”).
80. AT&T SUBMISSION, supra note 70, at 24.
81. Id.
82. Consumer Reports cell-service Ratings: AT&T is the worst carrier, CONSUMER
REPORTS (Dec. 6, 2010, 2:08 PM), http://news.consumerreports.org/electronics/2010/12/
consumer-reports-cell-phone-survey-att-worst.html.
83. AT&T SUBMISSION, supra note 70, at 2.
84. Andrew Dowell, Consumer Reports Says AT&T 'Worst-Rated' U.S. Carrier,
WALL ST. J., (Dec. 7, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article_email/SB100014240527487041
56304576003423395003238-lMyQjAxMTAxMDIwMjEyNDIyWj.html.
85. FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 720 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (relying on the
Horizontal Merger Guidelines).
86. DAVIDSON, supra note 8, at 64; Waller, Corporate Governance, supra note 9, at
873–79 (examining evidence from corporate finance that suggests entire categories of
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failure of many mergers to provide any significant value to shareholders or
consumers, the courts should, and likely would, “undertake a rigorous
analysis of the kinds of efficiencies being urged by the parties in order to
ensure that those ‘efficiencies’ represent more than mere speculation and
88
promises about postmerger behavior.”

B.

AT&T and T-Mobile Have Not Rebutted the Presumption That
the Significant Increase in Concentration in an Already Highly
Concentrated Industry Will Increase the Likelihood of Tacit
Collusion.

As the D.C. Circuit said, “[t]he combination of a concentrated market
89
and barriers to entry is a recipe for price coordination.” AT&T and TMobile have not rebutted this presumption. To successfully rebut the
ordinary presumption that either tacit or express collusion increases in a
highly concentrated industry postmerger, the merging parties would have to
establish with credible evidence that “[s]tructural market barriers to
90
collusion” are unique to their industry. The merging parties have not
shown why their industry is so unique that by removing a significant
competitor like T-Mobile will not make it easier to collude tacitly
postmerger.
Section 7.1 of the Merger Guidelines defines the general conditions
necessary for coordinated effects:
Pursuant to the Clayton Act’s incipiency standard, the Agencies may
challenge mergers that in their judgment pose a real danger of harm
through coordinated effects, even without specific evidence showing
precisely how the coordination likely would take place. The Agencies
are likely to challenge a merger if the following three conditions are all
met: (1) the merger would significantly increase concentration and lead
to a moderately or highly concentrated market; (2) that market shows
signs of vulnerability to coordinated conduct (see Section 7.2); and (3)
mergers are more likely to destroy, rather than enhance, shareholder value); Clayton M.
Christensen et al., The Big Idea: The New M&A Playbook, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar. 2011, at
49 (“study after study puts the failure rate of mergers and acquisitions somewhere between
70% and 90%”); Walter Adams & James W. Brock, Antitrust and Efficiency: A Comment,
62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1116, 1117 n.8 (1987) (collecting earlier studies).
87.
See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, The Behavioral Economics of Mergers and
Acquisitions, 12 TENN. J. BUS. L. 65, 71–74 (2011), available at http://trace.tennessee.
edu/transactions/vol12/iss2/4; Ulrike Malmendier, A “New” Paradigm in Corporate
Finance: The Role of Managers and Managerial Biases, 4 NBER REPORTER 13, 15–16
(2010), available at http://www.nber.org/reporter/2010number4/ulrike.html (collecting and
discussing earlier field studies that correlate between overconfidence and acquisitions by
cash-rich firms not dependent on external financing).
88. H.J. Heinz, 246 F.3d at 721.
89. Id. at 724.
90. Id.
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the Agencies have a credible basis on which to conclude that the
merger may enhance that vulnerability. An acquisition eliminating a
maverick firm (see Section 2.1.5) in a market vulnerable to coordinated
91
conduct is likely to cause adverse coordinated effects.

As we discuss in Part III, the industry is already highly concentrated.
Moreover, there is no evidence of structural barriers to collusion. The few
remaining firms can quickly detect and punish any attempt to increase
competition by reducing price. In this industry, pricing and other terms of
sale are highly transparent and are easily compared. These terms include:
monthly fee; coverage area; included minutes, text, and data; overage and
roaming charges; length of contract; penalties; activation fee; and optional
features.
The condition that there be rapid responses by rivals also appears to
be true. One critic of the acquisition (FreePress) states that AT&T and
Verizon “have a long history of raising prices in concert, as they both did
early last year [2010] by requiring all customers on feature phones to add
92
data plans.”
The FCC gives another example of how transparency affects price
competition in its Fourteenth Mobile Wireless Competition Report. The
example is particularly noteworthy. It shows how T-Mobile, acting as a
price-cutter, prompted AT&T and Verizon to narrow their price premium
on unlimited service offerings:
91. Unlimited Calling Plans. The focus of price competition now
appears to be shifting to unlimited service offerings. In an effort to
reduce churn, T-Mobile introduced a lower-priced version of its
unlimited national voice calling plan in the first quarter of 2009, but
limited its availability to select existing customers. With the
subsequent launch of its new “Even More” plans in October 2009, TMobile reset prices on tiered offerings at significant discounts to its
legacy plans, and brought its pricing structure more closely into line
with that of Sprint Nextel, the least expensive nationwide service
provider. The biggest pricing changes were made on T-Mobile’s
unlimited service offerings, which include bundled voice, text and data
offerings as well as an unlimited voice-only calling plan. At the same
time, T-Mobile discontinued its myFaves unlimited calling circle offer.
92. Even before T-Mobile launched its new pricing plans, Verizon
Wireless and AT&T priced their postpaid service offerings at a
premium relative to those of T-Mobile and Sprint Nextel. According to
analysts, this premium reflected the willingness of consumers to pay
higher prices for access to preferred handsets and data offerings, and in

91. 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 42, at § 7.1.
92. FreePress, Why the AT&T-T-Mobile Deal is Bad for America, FREEPRESS 2
(2011), http://www.freepress.net/files/ATT-TMobile.pdf (footnote omitted).
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Verizon Wireless’s case, positive perceptions of its network. TMobile’s price changes appear to have prompted Verizon Wireless and
AT&T to narrow the price premium on unlimited service offerings. In
January 2010, Verizon Wireless reduced the prices of its unlimited
voice plans for both individual and shared family offerings. Later the
same day, AT&T responded to Verizon Wireless’s changes with
matching price reductions on its unlimited voice plans. While Verizon
Wireless’s and AT&T’s unlimited plan price cuts were significant,
their postpaid service offerings remained the most expensive in the
industry, even following these price changes, as the prices of Sprint
Nextel’s and T-Mobile’s equivalent or comparable unlimited plans had
93
already declined sharply.

Comparison of Unlimited Pricing Plans94
Verizon Wireless

AT&T

T-Mobile

Sprint Nextel

Voice

$69.99

$69.99

$59.99

Not offered

Voice + Text

$89.99

$89.99

$69.99

Not offered

Voice + Text + Basic Data

$99.99

$99.99

$79.99

Not offered

Voice + Text + Smartphone Data

$119.99

$119.99

$99.99

$99.99

There are probably many other examples of competitive moves and
responses over time. They may involve the introduction and pricing of
calling plans, commitment periods and penalties, pricing for subsidized
handsets, and so forth. In each of these dimensions, the market is fully
transparent to a competitor.
The merging parties may argue that tacit collusion is unlikely,
because, postmerger, Sprint would become the maverick firm and undercut
any attempt by AT&T and Verizon to raise prices, reduce consumer
choices, or decrease their incentives to innovate. Sprint’s incentives to
serve as a maverick would arguably change, however, after a merger.
Sprint may conclude that it would do better by going along with AT&T and
Verizon than by trying to undercut them and gain customers. It may be
possible to model the gains to Sprint depending on which strategy it
pursued.
Nor has AT&T established that other firms would restore competition
postmerger. Other than Sprint and Verizon, the other firms in the market
are so small, so capacity constrained, or so dependent on Verizon and
AT&T that they would not be likely to act as a check on coordinated
95
interaction.
93. 14th Mobile Wireless Competition Report, supra note 23, at paras. 91–92
(citations omitted).
94. Id. at para. 92.
95. See 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 42, § 7.2 (firms with small
market shares may serve as a check on coordinated interaction, but only if they can rapidly
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Handset Competition and Innovation

The merger will also likely lead to less choice and higher prices to
consumers for handsets, and will give AT&T more power over handset
suppliers. Price and nonprice competition among the mobile wireless
handset manufacturers, according to the FCC, affects competitive outcomes
in the mobile wireless service market. Competition is also shaped by the
96
provider-as-retailer model of handset distribution. “Bundling contracts
and exclusive handset arrangements are firm conduct that occurs frequently
97
in the provider-as-retailer model of handset distribution.”
The merger removes a company that buys and subsidizes handsets.
The loss of a significant competitor means that handset manufacturers have
one less customer they could turn to, or threaten to turn to, in negotiations
with mobile service providers. Moreover, consumers may see their choices
of handsets narrowed after the merger. Consumer costs for phones could
also increase as the merged company faces less competitive pressure to
subsidize phone prices as much as before. Another possible effect is that
98
the growth of Android-based devices will be slowed. T-Mobile has been
the leader in offering these devices as a means of countering the iPhone.
There are numerous trade press reports and advertisements showing this
99
ongoing competition.
The introduction of Android software and devices is summarized in
the FCC’s Thirteenth Mobile Wireless Competition Report as follows:
171. The Twelfth Report noted that the development of Android was
announced in November 2007 by the Open Handset Alliance—an
alliance of 34 handset makers, wireless providers and other technology
companies led by Google Inc. (“Google”), T-Mobile, High Tech
Computer Corporation (“HTC”), Qualcomm, and Motorola which was
formed to accelerate innovation and “openness” in the provision of
mobile wireless services. The Twelfth Report further noted that
Android was intended to be the “first open, complete, and free platform
created specifically for mobile devices,” and that it was set to be
commercially deployed in the second half of 2008.
172. As revealed in subsequent reports about its development, the
Android system is a set of operating software developed by Google
that is designed to support several different objectives. First, Android
expand their sales in the relevant market).
96. 14th Mobile Wireless Competition Report, supra note 23, at para. 311.
97. Id.
98. Google Projects for Android, GOOGLE CODE, http://code.google.com/android/ (last
visited Nov. 15, 2011) (“Android is a software stack for mobile devices that includes an
operating system, middleware, and key applications.”).
99. See, e.g., Walt Mossberg, Google Answers the iPhone, ALL THINGS DIGITAL (Oct.
15, 2008, 9:02 PM), http://ptech.allthingsd.com/20081015/google-answers-the-iphone/.
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supports and brings together in one package a number of applications
Google has developed for mobile handsets, including a search service,
Google maps and a new advanced mobile Web browser that is intended
to rival the browser on the Apple iPhone. Second, Android provides a
platform to support a marketplace for applications made by other
companies. Like Apple’s software development kit and App Store,
Android is designed to make it easier for third-party software
developers to make their applications available on mobile handsets and
to integrate these applications with handset features such as locationsensing technology. Third, despite its use of Google’s search service
and other Google applications, the Android system allows wireless
service providers to customize the Android software to promote their
own data services and content. Google is making the Android
operating software available free of charge to handset manufacturers
[sic] and wireless service providers in order to encourage the
development and deployment of handsets based on Android.
173. Although Google originally planned to launch the new Android
handsets in the second half of 2008, subsequently the company
indicated that the handsets would not be commercially available until
the fourth quarter of 2008. Several factors contributed to the delays,
including: (1) the inherent difficulty of managing a project in which
Google had to collaborate with and coordinate the work of many
different providers to support its Android technology platform,
including handset manufacturers, wireless service providers, software
developers and chip set makers; (2) challenges wireless service
providers have encountered in their efforts to customize the Android
software and brand their own devices; and (3) various challenges that
confronted software developers in working with Google’s
programming tools and creating programs for Android.
174. Google and T-Mobile unveiled the first Android device, the G1, in
September 2008, and the following month T-Mobile became the first
U.S. provider to launch a handset that uses the Android operating
system. The G1 runs on both T-Mobile’s mobile broadband
WCDMA/HSDPA network, which T-Mobile is still in the early stages
of rolling out, and also on slower networks using older GSM-family
technologies. In addition to Google’s advanced new mobile Web
browser, search interface and other Google applications such as maps,
Gmail and YouTube, the G1 also features a touch-screen that slides
open to reveal a real physical keypad underneath, a trackball that
supplements the touch-screen navigation, GPS navigation, Wi-Fi
access and Bluetooth connections, among other gadgets and functions.
Although the Google applications come installed on the G1, the G1 has
an applications store, called the Android Market, where G1 users will
be able to download programs created by third-party developers.
However, while Google maintains that the G1 leaves it up to
consumers to decide what they want to run on their cellphones, one
reviewer points out that the G1 is “tightly tied to Google’s Web-based
email, contacts and calendar programs.” Nevertheless, while noting
many differences between the G1 and Apple’s iPhone, the same
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reviewer concludes that, like Apple’s product, Google’s G1 is “a
100
serious handheld computer with a powerful new operating system.”

Choice of devices is important to consumers, who increasingly are
choosing a wireless service based on the devices that are available.
According to the FCC’s Fourteenth Mobile Wireless Competition Report:
299. Handsets and devices are becoming increasingly central to the
dynamics of the overall wireless market. Recent studies show handsets
playing an increasingly important role for consumers as a basis for
choosing providers, although these studies differ as to the level of
importance of handsets to consumers. For example, a recent report
from Consumers Union provides data that suggests that many
consumers switched to new wireless service providers in order to
obtain a particular handset. Specifically, the report states that during
the two-year period of 2008 through 2009, 38 percent of respondents
who had switched providers did so because it was the only way to
obtain the handset that they wanted. The same report also indicates that
27 percent of all respondents had a specific wireless handset in mind
when they went shopping for a new handset. A first quarter 2009
survey by Nielsen Company shows handsets were the seventh most
important reason consumers chose their existing wireless provider,
although handset choice increased in importance to 6.4 percent from
2.9 percent in the third quarter of 2006. Recent analyst reports also
identify access to handsets as an increasing challenge faced by mid101
sized and small providers.

Viewed from a handset manufacturer’s perspective, the acquisition
removes a significant buyer from the market. This is likely to have a
nontrivial impact on handset manufacturers’ ability to negotiate. It is
possible that the change will also reinforce AT&T’s incentives to compete
for exclusive deals, and Verizon will also find this to be the most viable
strategy. This could easily result in Sprint not being a fully competitive
alternative, putting further pressure on its long-term survival given the
trends showing the importance of handset choice.

2.

Text Messages

Text message prices may be an example of successfully coordinated
conduct in the wireless industry. The theory is that with only a few firms
offering the service, it is relatively easy for those firms to coordinate on
pricing, and there does seem to be some evidence that such coordination

100. Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1993, Thirteenth Report, 24 F.C.C.R. 6185, para. 171–74 (2009), http://hraunfoss.fcc.
gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-09-54A1.pdf (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
101. 14th Mobile Wireless Competition Report, supra note 23, at para. 299 (citations
omitted).
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has in fact occurred. According to Senator Herb Kohl, who oversaw Senate
hearings in 2009 on text message prices:
As their popularity has grown, so has the price charged on a per
message basis. From 2006 to 2008, the price of sending and receiving a
text message among the four largest cell phone carriers increased by
100%–from 10 to 20 cents per message. The four companies increased
their text messaging prices in two steps–first from 10 to 15 cents, and
then from 15 to 20 cents–within weeks or even days of each other.
These lockstep price increases occurred despite the fact that the cost to
the phone companies to carry text messages is minimal–estimated to be
102
less than a penny per message–and has not increased.

The Seventh Circuit recently affirmed the district court’s decision not
to dismiss a conspiracy case alleging text messaging price-fixing against
103
The Court of Appeals noted, among other
the four national carriers.
things, that the four defendants sold ninety percent of U.S. text messaging
services; it would not be difficult for such a small group to agree on prices
and to be able to detect “cheating”; prices had been declining; and “all at
once the defendants changed their pricing structures, which were
heterogeneous and complex, to a uniform pricing structure, and then
104
simultaneously jacked up their prices by a third.”
Pricing of text messages may present a natural experiment on
coordinated pricing behavior in the industry. The use of text messages
rapidly expanded in 2008–2009, and the industry at that point apparently
was sufficiently concentrated for coordinated interaction to occur. It is also
possible that going from four to three “national” firms will result in even
higher text message prices, which would be a merger effect.

3.

Parallel Accommodating Conduct

The 1997 Merger Guidelines stated that “[s]uccessful coordinated
interaction entails reaching terms of coordination that are profitable to the
firms involved and an ability to detect and punish deviations that would
105
The text message example
undermine the coordinated interaction.”
above is an illustration of a potentially profitable strategy that includes the
ability to detect and punish deviations. But economic theory has recognized
for some time that there are forms of coordinated interaction that are

102. Press Release, Senator Herb Kohl, Kohl Examines Causes of Rising Text Message
Pricing (June 16, 2009), http:// http://kohl.senate.gov/newsroom/pressrelease.cfm?customel_
dataPageID_1464=2870.
103. In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 630 F.3d 622 (7th Cir. 2010).
104. Id. at 628.
105. U.S. Dep’t of Justice & FTC, Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 2.1, at 18 (1997).
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profitable but do not involve the requirement (borrowed from classic cartel
106
theory) that the firms involved be able to “detect and punish” cheating.
The revised 2010 Merger Guidelines refine the analysis and bring it
into line with economic theory. The new Merger Guidelines identify three
kinds of coordinated behavior: (1) “explicit negotiation of a common
understanding of how firms will compete or refrain from competing”; (2)
“a similar common understanding that is not explicitly negotiated but
would be enforced by the detection and punishment of deviations . . . ”; and
(3) “parallel accommodating conduct not pursuant to a prior
107
understanding.”
In discussing parallel accommodating conduct, the revised Merger
Guidelines state: “Parallel accommodating conduct includes situations in
which each rival’s response to competitive moves made by others is
individually rational, and not motivated by retaliation or deterrence nor
intended to sustain an agreed-upon market outcome, but nevertheless
emboldens price increases and weakens competitive incentives to reduce
108
There is no need for the
prices or offer customers better terms.”
participants to “detect and punish” cheating.
DOJ was concerned about parallel accommodating conduct in its
109
In
challenges to the Worldcom/Sprint and Alcan/Pechiney mergers.
language that may prove equally applicable here, DOJ alleged in Alcan:
“[a]fter the acquisition, the combined firm and its largest North American
rival would share market leadership and a common incentive to pursue
strategies that emphasize accommodation and do not risk provocation.”110

4.

Unilateral Effects

Alternatively, the merger can be analyzed under a unilateral effects
theory. In the context of the incipiency standard, the agencies’ unilateral
effects analysis is better viewed as a complement for cases where market
definition is less straightforward. In differentiated product industries, some
products can be very close substitutes and compete strongly with each
106. See SERGE X. MORESI ET AL., GAUGING PARALLEL ACCOMMODATING CONDUCT
CONCERNS WITH THE CPPI 2 (2011) (“Parallel accommodating conduct . . . has a long
history in oligopoly theory, dating back more than seventy years.”).
107. 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 42, § 7, at 24.
108. Id. § 7, at 24–25.
109. Carl Shapiro, Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Economics, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Antitrust Div., Update from the Antitrust Division: Remarks as Prepared for the
American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law Fall Forum (Nov. 18, 2010),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/264295.pdf at 28–29.
110. Complaint at para. 22, at 8, United States v. Alcan Inc. (D.D.C. 2003), No. 1:030212, available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f201300/201303.htm.
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other, while other products are more distant substitutes and compete less
strongly. A merger between firms selling differentiated products may
diminish competition by enabling the merged firm to profit by unilaterally
raising the price of one or both products above the premerger level. So, as
one recent example, DOJ can challenge a merger involving “value”
111
shampoo, conditioners, and hairspray. Whether the market is defined as
shampoo generally or value shampoo specifically, the antitrust agency can
predict that the prices for one or both of the merging firms’ product will
increase postmerger. The agency will base its prediction on diversion
ratios, the estimated consumer demand at postmerger prices, and the profit
112
margins of the merging parties’ hair products.
The problem is that unilateral effects theory has become the opium of
merger review. If the agency can predict the likely postmerger price
increases for value shampoos, white pan bread, or baby wipes, then the
merging parties and courts will demand the FTC and DOJ prove for every
merger how prices will increase postmerger, and by what magnitude. It is
not surprising then that most merger cases in recent years are challenged
113
However, as one former head of the
under a unilateral effects theory.
Antitrust Division observed,
[U]nilateral effects should not be the theory of choice simply by
default. If we reach too quickly for unilateral effects theories to the
exclusion of meaningful coordinated effects analysis, we might miss
important cases that should be brought or craft our relief too narrowly
114
in cases that we actually pursue.

Where market definition and entry barriers are relatively
straightforward, it is questionable whether DOJ needs to rely on a unilateral
effects theory, the utility of which is where market definition is less
straightforward or meaningful (such as whether the market is defined as
value shampoos or shampoo generally). Nonetheless, we discuss below
how a unilateral effects theory applies here. But we do so with the
111. Complaint at para. 2, at 2, United States v. Unilever N.V. (D.D.C. 2011), No.
1:11-00858, http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f270800/270856.pdf.
112. Rachel Brandenburger & Joseph Matelis, The 2010 U.S. Horizontal Merger
Guidelines: A Historical and International Perspective, 25-SUM ANTITRUST 48 (2011),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_magazine/Antitrust_253_brandenburger_matelis.authcheckdam.pdf; Carl Shapiro, The 2010 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines: From Hedgehog to Fox in Forty Years, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 49 (2010).
113. Charles A. James, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Rediscovering Coordinated Effects, Address at the American Bar Association
Annual Meeting, Section of Antitrust Law (Aug. 13, 2002), http://www.justice.gov/atr/
public/speeches/200124.pdf at 7–8 (noting “one interesting side-effect of the 1992
Guidelines has been the emergence of unilateral effects as the predominant theory of
economic harm pursued in government merger investigations and challenges.”).
114. Id. at 9.
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important caveat that the incipiency standard controls. The fact that DOJ
can show that the merger significantly increases the likelihood of a
substantial unilateral price increase simply provides additional evidence of
why the merger violates the Clayton Act.
Although the Merger Guidelines outline several types of unilateral
effects, the most likely candidate theory here involves pricing of
differentiated products:
The concept of unilateral effects is simple to describe: In markets
characterized by product differentiation, mergers between close
competitors are likely to lead to higher prices absent postmerger
repositioning of other products in the market and/or efficiencies. In the
usual case, the merging firms sell products (A and B) that consumers
perceive to be close competitive substitutes for each other. Other
products, while perhaps being functional substitutes on some level, are
viewed by the consumers of A and B to be substantially differentiated
from A and B in terms of product attributes, such that changes in the
prices of A or B do not lead consumers to choose other products in
significant numbers. After A and B come under common control, the
price of A could be raised because many of the consumers of A would
switch to B, the profits of which, instead of being lost by the firm
selling A, would now be captured by the merged firm. Other
consumers would stay with A and pay [the] higher price . . . .
It is the diversion of consumers from A to B, compared to a diversion
to any other products, that permits a postmerger price increase. (Note
that the same could be said about increases in the price of B leading to
115
significant diversion to A[)].

It is beyond this Article’s scope to analyze “upward pricing pressure” or
diversion ratios. However, several observations may be offered.
It seems likely that the parties are relatively close substitutes. First,
they offer similar plans and services, although, T-Mobile tries to price
116
somewhat lower and also has somewhat lower profit margins.
Second, it is likely that the real market for “low-end” customers is in
prepaid plans as opposed to postpaid plans. Prepaid plans are a way to cut
costs and avoid the lengthy contracts that come with traditional cell phone
plans. Prepaid plans have been growing rapidly (probably because of the
recession) but they generate much lower revenue per subscriber than
117
postpaid plans.

115. Charles Biggio, Whole Foods’ Impact on Unilateral Effects, GLOBAL
COMPETITION POLICY, Sept. 2008, http://www.wsgr.com/PDFSearch/wholefoods0908.pdf.
116. See 14th Mobile Wireless Competition Report, supra note 23, at paras. 214–21
(applying various measures of profitability).
117. 14th Mobile Wireless Competition Report, supra note 23, at para. 163.
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If the DOJ applies an “upward pricing pressure” analysis, the result is
likely to confirm the intuition (and fear) of many T-Mobile customers: that
AT&T has an incentive to raise T-Mobile prices postmerger. AT&T has
both a significantly higher market share and significantly higher margins
than T-Mobile. If AT&T raises T-Mobile prices postmerger, it will likely
recapture a high enough percentage of defecting T-Mobile customers that
the price increase will be profitable. On the other hand, AT&T probably
has much less of an incentive to raise prices on its own customers
postmerger.
Indeed, AT&T’s own unilateral effects analysis in past transactions
highlights this concern. In its November 2008 FCC filing in connection
with the acquisition of Centennial Communications, AT&T argued that
Centennial was not a particularly close substitute because “AT&T focuses
on the other national carriers in its competitive decision making and does
118
not consider Centennial in deciding on pricing and service offerings.” It
recognized that the number of competitors and share of the merging firms
119
were relevant. And it is worth noting that AT&T’s past arguments about
the ease of competitive repositioning do not square with its own repeated
statements in this merger about the increasing demands consumers are
120
placing on wireless networks.

5.

Exclusionary Effects

Finally, the merger can be analyzed under an exclusionary effects
theory. The theory is that a merger may enable the merged firm to engage
in exclusionary conduct after the merger—for example, by denying rivals
access to needed inputs, by cutting off their access to customers, or
121
otherwise by raising their costs. When a merger enhances the ability of a
firm to exclude rivals, the result may be harm to competition. The harmful

118. AT&T, MERGER OF AT&T INC. AND CENTENNIAL COMMUNICATIONS CORP.,
DESCRIPTION OF TRANSACTION, PUBLIC INTEREST SHOWING AND RELATED DEMONSTRATIONS
37 (Nov. 21, 2008), available at https://wireless2.fcc.gov/UlsEntry/attachments/attachment
ViewRD.jsp;ATTACHMENTS=1N6VJL5K37mPzN1G7L2XKBP7mC5jC50m96ttqVlHZr
3GL1cyJSgx!-659400886!-849295342?applType=search&fileKey=843683410&attachment
Key=18355849&attachmentInd=applAttach.
119. Id. at 36.
120. AT&T argued in connection with the Centennial acquisition that “[t]he
Commission also has noted that a merger such as this one does not take spectrum away from
any competing carriers – that is, no competitor is made worse off by the transaction – and
has focused its review on whether competitors would be able to compete effectively at a
later point in the deployment of next-generation services.” Id. at 27.
121. Sprint raises these concerns in its complaint challenging the merger. Complaint at
paras. 208–16, Sprint Nextel Corp. v. AT&T, Inc. (2011), No. 1:11-cv-01600, http://www.
appliedantitrust.com/08_mergerII/cases_doj/att/sprint/sprint_ddc_complaint9_6_2011.pdf.
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effects of exclusionary practices have been recognized both in case law122
123
and by economists for many years.
The 2010 Merger Guidelines now explicitly make this theory part of
the antitrust review. Section 2.2.3 of the Merger Guidelines expresses
skepticism toward most competitor concerns about competitive effects, but
contains an exception for exclusionary conduct:
Information from firms that are rivals to the merging parties can help
illuminate how the market operates. The interests of rival firms often
diverge from the interests of customers, since customers normally lose,
but rival firms gain, if the merged entity raises its prices. For that
reason, the Agencies do not routinely rely on the overall views of rival
firms regarding the competitive effects of the merger. However, rival
firms may provide relevant facts, and even their overall views may be
instructive, especially in cases where the Agencies are concerned that
124
the merged entity may engage in exclusionary conduct.

This theory of harm is particularly relevant to the AT&T/T-Mobile
merger. The merging parties have asserted that smaller regional and local
carriers will replace any competition lost through the merger, and,
therefore, will constrain AT&T from exercising market power postmerger. For this claim to be true, the smaller carriers must be able to
develop and grow into a significant competitive force in the marketplace. If
the merged firm can make it significantly more expensive for the smaller
companies to operate, or otherwise act to block or limit their growth, the
parties’ claim becomes highly suspect.
Exclusionary theories are put forward in a number of the comments
on the merger filed with the FCC. As one example, Cincinnati Bell
Wireless (“CBW”) is a regional carrier that serves approximately 509,000
subscribers in the greater Cincinnati and Dayton metropolitan areas as well
125
as several counties in Indiana and northern Kentucky. Like AT&T and
T-Mobile, CBW is a GSM-based carrier (GSM or Global System for
Mobile Communications is the most prevalent standard for technologies in
cellular networks). Because the parties hold out CBW as one of the
regional carriers that would allegedly replace the competition lost by the
merger, it is worth noting the difference in their relative sizes. Postmerger,
122. See, e.g., MCI Comm. Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1131–33 (7th Cir. 1983)
(holding AT&T liable for raising the costs of actual and potential entrants into long distance
service by denying them equal access to local telephone network).
123. See, e.g., Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Analyzing Anticompetitive
Exclusion, 56 ANTITRUST L. J. 71, 81–82 (1987).
124. 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 42, § 2.2.3, at 5–6 (emphasis
added).
125. Petition of Cincinnati Bell Wireless LLC to Condition Consent or Deny
Applications at 7, Applications of AT&T Inc. and Deutsche Telekom AG (No. 11-65)
(2011), available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7021681268.

Number 1]

AT&T/T-MOBILE

77

the combined AT&T and T-Mobile would be approximately 250 times the
size of CBW, yet CBW would be the second largest GSM-based carrier in
126
the country.
Regional carriers like CBW must give their customers the ability to
roam out of the local region onto the networks of other carriers. Because
CBW is GSM-based, the only two current choices for a roaming partner in
127
most markets are AT&T and T-Mobile, and the company currently has
roaming contracts with both of them.
CBW states that AT&T’s rates for voice and data roaming are
128
Postmerger, AT&T
approximately twice as high as T-Mobile’s rates.
would be the only remaining 3G roaming alternative since AT&T has
129
already announced its intention to shut down T-Mobile’s 3G network.
And CBW claims that in the past, AT&T has engaged in repeated acts of
exclusionary conduct, including:
charging unreasonable roaming rates; denying roaming access on its
advanced data networks and opening access only after severe delays, at
unreasonably high rates, and upon anticompetitive conditions;
preventing access to contiguous or quality spectrum by buying it up
through both auctions and merger; and denying access to new and
innovative handset technology by tying manufacturers into exclusive
arrangements and specifying “single carrier” handset designs
130
developed for use only on its network.

It does not require much imagination to see how the proposed merger could
make things appreciably worse for firms like CBW and consumers. Losing
T-Mobile as a supplier both exposes CBW to a roaming rate increase and
increases its vulnerability to further exclusionary conduct by AT&T. Far
from being able to grow and provide meaningful competition to the merged
firm, CBW and similar firms are likely to be hemmed in if not further
marginalized.
As a final point, the agencies most often encounter exclusionary
conduct in vertical mergers or in mergers with a vertical dimension, such as
where the merged firm supplies needed inputs to customers who are also
131
competitors. But there can be exclusionary effects on a purely horizontal
126. Id. at 15–16.
127. Id. at 3.
128. Id. at 16.
129. Id. at 6.
130. Id. at ii (emphasis omitted).
131. Jonathan B. Baker, Comcast/NBCU: The FCC Provides a Roadmap for Vertical
Merger Analysis, 25-SPG ANTITRUST 36, 37 (2011) (noting how vertical mergers can harm
competition by facilitating exclusion by foreclosing “unaffiliated downstream rivals from
access to the integrated firm's upstream product (input foreclosure), and foreclosure of
unaffiliated upstream rivals from access to the integrated firm's downstream business
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basis as well. The Merger Guidelines provide an example of such
exclusionary effects in an industry characterized by “network effects.”
Broadly speaking, there are “network effects” if one person’s adoption of a
good (a) benefits other adopters of the good and (b) increases others’
132
incentives to adopt it.
Merging Firms A and B operate in a market in which network effects
are significant, implying that any firm’s product is significantly more
valuable if it commands a large market share or if it is interconnected
with others that in aggregate command such a share. Prior to the
merger, they and their rivals voluntarily interconnect with one another.
The merger would create an entity with a large enough share that a
strategy of ending voluntary interconnection would have a dangerous
probability of creating monopoly power in this market. The interests of
rivals and of consumers would be broadly aligned in preventing such a
133
merger.

Telecommunications is an industry subject to significant network effects.
Indeed, the telephone is a classic example of network effects. In the early,
unregulated era of telephone service, the dominant Bell system simply
134
refused to interconnect with independent local phone companies.
The existence of network effects in the mobile wireless industry may
be seen in handset exclusivity. As the FCC noted, exclusive contracting for
handsets only takes place “with providers that have larger customer bases
135
and extensive network penetration.” Indeed, the FCC notes that while all
of the four nationwide providers have some exclusive arrangements, the
136
non-nationwide providers typically do not.
In what ways could the merger change the strategy of the merging
parties given the existence of network effects? One possibility is that the
merger will further enhance AT&T’s incentive and ability to demand
handset exclusivity. A second possibility is that AT&T, which currently
137
has reciprocal roaming agreements with several carriers, could find itself

(customer foreclosure)”).
132.
Joseph Farrell & Paul Klemperer, Coordination and Lock-In: Competition with
Switching Costs and Network Effects, in 3 HANDBOOK OF INDUS. ORG. 1967 (Mark
Armstrong and Robert Porter eds., 2007).
133.
2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 42, § 2.2.3, at 6.
134.
Wu, supra note 22, at 45–50.
135.
Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1993, Fifteenth Report, 25 F.C.C.R. 11407, para. 342 (2011). WT Docket No. 10-133,
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-11-103A1.pdf.
136.
Id.
137.
See Joint Opposition of AT&T Inc., Deutsche Telekom Ag, and T-Mobile USA,
Inc. to Petitions to Deny and Reply to Comments at 156-58, Applications of AT&T Inc. and
Deutsche Telekom AG (No. 11-65) (2011), http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?
id=7021686831.
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in a position after the merger where it no longer needs those carriers as
roaming partners. Reciprocal roaming agreements, according to AT&T,
138
provide a check on roaming rates since the parties need each other.
Postmerger, the situation may be more like AT&T and CBW, where CBW
139
roams on AT&T’s network but not vice versa.
A third possibility involves network infrastructure. T-Mobile was a
founding member of the “Open Handset Alliance,” a broad alliance of
technology and wireless firms that joined forces to develop the Android
140
Such an alliance requires the possibility of a return on
platform.
considerable investments. One can readily imagine a postmerger world in
which the inability to reach a sufficient number of wireless customers
would make it impossible for a firm or group of firms to recoup their
investments, and, as a result, the investments would not be made.

V. REMEDIES
As Part III shows, this merger is presumptively anticompetitive. As
Part IV discusses, AT&T and T-Mobile in their public documents have not
overcome this presumption of illegality by (i) showing how consumers will
overall benefit with merger-specific efficiencies and (ii) rebutting the
presumption that the significant increase in concentration, in an already
highly-concentrated industry, will increase the likelihood of tacit collusion.
Consequently, looming large is the question of remedy. At the end of the
day, if DOJ concludes that the merger violates the Clayton Act, what is the
cure? There are three possibilities: sue to block the merger, agree to
divestitures, or agree to behavioral conditions.
In the past several years, wireless mergers involving the four national
facilities-based providers have mostly involved an expansion of coverage,
and the entities that were combined for the most part had not competed in
most of the geographic areas. Where there was overlap, the FCC required
141
divestitures. A chart of the recent mergers appears below.

138. Reply of Cincinnati Bell Wireless LLC at 5, Applications for Consent to the
Transfer of Control of Licenses at 5, Applications of AT&T Inc. and Deutsche Telekom AG
(No. 11-65) (2011), available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=
7021688585.
139.
Id.
140.
Press Release, Industry Leaders Announce Open Platform for Mobile Devices
(Nov. 5, 2007), available at http://www.openhandsetalliance.com/press_110507.html.
141. 14th Mobile Wireless Competition Report, supra note 23, at para. 75, Table 9.
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Merger

2005

Sprint/Nextel

2007

AT&T/Dobson

2008

AT&T/Aloha
T-Mobile/Suncom
Verizon Wireless/Rural Cellular
Verizon Wireless/Alltel
Sprint Nextel/Clearwire

2009

AT&T/Centennial

Significantly, according to the FCC, most of the divestitures in the
Verizon/Rural Cellular and Verizon/Alltel mergers were to go to AT&T.
Most of the divestitures in the AT&T/Centennial merger were to go to
142
Verizon. Assuming this took place, it shows how few potential buyers
there were, and that the FCC and DOJ were apparently willing to accept an
increase in national market concentration to remedy local concerns. The
question is whether the same analysis would apply here when the present
acquisition (i) would increase concentration nationally and in numerous
local markets, and (ii) is not a geographic expansion. At a minimum, it is
highly unlikely that either the FCC or DOJ would accept divestitures to
Verizon in the present merger. In addition, DOJ prefers to have a single
buyer on the theory that a merger that removes a single competitor is best
remedied by replacing the single competitor with another as opposed to a
143
But divesting assets to someone who is already in the market
group.
144
does not really remedy the competitive loss caused by a merger.
142. Id. at para. 84.
143. Indeed, the DOJ guidelines on merger remedies refer to a single purchaser of the
assets. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIV., ANTITRUST DIVISION POLICY GUIDE TO
MERGER REMEDIES (June 2011), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/272350.pdf
[hereinafter 2011 Policy Guide to Merger Remedies].
144. DOJ noted that its approval will be conditioned on three fundamental tests, one of
which is that the “divestiture of the assets to the proposed purchaser must not itself cause
competitive harm”:
For example, if the concern is that the merger will enhance an already
dominant firm’s ability unilaterally to exercise market power, divestiture to
another large competitor in the market is not likely to be acceptable, although
divestiture to a fringe incumbent might. If the concern is one of coordinated
effects among a small set of postmerger competitors, divestiture to any firm in
that set would itself raise competitive issues. In that situation, the Division
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Behavioral Remedies

Behavioral conditions or behavioral remedies include imposing the
requirement that the merged company agree to price or access terms, or
otherwise change its conduct. For example, if there is concern that AT&T
could disadvantage its competitors by charging excessive special access
fees, AT&T could be ordered to provide access on reasonable and
nondiscriminatory terms. If there is concern about exclusive agreements
with handset manufacturers, AT&T could agree not to enter such exclusive
agreements.
DOJ, under the Obama Administration, has been receptive to
behavioral remedies, whereby DOJ permits a merger but regulates the
145
behavior of the merging parties. Historically, based on sound practical
reasons, the antitrust agencies preferred structural remedies (requiring
divestiture of assets) over behavioral ones.
Behavioral remedies are unattractive for many reasons, as DOJ itself
146
has recognized. DOJ is not set up as a regulatory agency. The staff that
works on this merger will be disbanded and move on to other matters when
the review is finished. The head of DOJ Antitrust Division from both
Republican and Democratic parties have said that DOJ is not, and should
not be, in the business of ongoing oversight of remedies. Indeed, to the
extent that DOJ is market-oriented, behavioral remedies are perverse, in
that they limit the ability of a firm to make market-based decisions, and
they are by necessity applied only to the merged firm and not to its
competitors.
Thus, behavioral remedies should be used only when no other
alternative exists, such as in vertical mergers where the main theory of
147
In
harm is that rivals will be foreclosed from the market.
telecommunications mergers, they tend to be used mostly for the sake of
148
parallel orders. If the FCC wants to impose a behavioral remedy, DOJ
may also include it in a decree. But it should be understood that adding
likely would approve divestiture only to a firm outside that set.
Id. at 28.
145. Id. at 12–13.
146. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION POLICY GUIDE TO MERGER REMEDIES
8–9 (Oct. 2004, rev. 2011), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/205108.htm.
147. 2011 Policy Guide to Merger Remedies, supra note 143, at 2 (“[C]onduct
remedies often can effectively address anticompetitive issues raised by vertical mergers.”).
148. See, e.g., Philip J. Weiser, Reexamining the Legacy of Dual Regulation:
Reforming Dual Merger Review by the DOJ and the FCC, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 167, 179
(2008) (“When the DOJ imposes a behavioral requirement to address concerns about
vertical relations, it often replicates or anticipates efforts taken by the FCC.”). The author
goes on to give several examples.
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behavioral remedies to a consent decree usually accomplishes little, if
anything, from DOJ’s standpoint—it is done because it is a relatively lowcost, even if relatively low-return, proposition.

B.

Divestitures

Partial divestiture of assets by one or both of the merging firms is a
different story. Divestitures may be ordered if only parts of a deal are
problematic. In a horizontal merger, divestitures are used to fix
149
competitively significant overlaps. If the acquiring company offers many
products, but only competes with the acquired company in one of those
products, that product line may be divested. Or if the acquiring company
competes with the acquired company in only one geographic location, its
business in that location may be divested. So the first point is that
divestitures generally only make sense when the problematic overlaps are
small relative to the size of the deal.
A second issue is, who is the buyer? Divestitures, like any remedy,
are intended to replace the competition lost through a merger. This has led
to a number of requirements being imposed on a prospective buyer before
DOJ will approve the buyer. For example, you do not want a buyer who
has never managed a business like the one being divested. Firms who enter
150
new and unfamiliar businesses often fail. For similar reasons, you do not
want a buyer who is undercapitalized and needs to rely on the merged
company to provide financing. That buyer may pull its punches because it
is on the hook to the merged company. You also do not want the divested
assets sold to several smaller buyers. While each of those buyers may be
fine, they are also individually weaker than the original firm was, and,
therefore, may be less effective competitors. Finally, you want an entire
business divested, not just pieces of the business. History teaches that
divestitures of complete businesses are much more likely to succeed than
151
just certain assets or licenses.
So let us apply these well-accepted principles to the current AT&T/TMobile merger. First, the overlaps here are not small relative to the size of
149. 2011 Policy Guide to Merger Remedies, supra note 143, at 5 (“Divestiture of
overlapping assets, usually an existing business entity, can effectively preserve competition
that the merger otherwise would eliminate.”).
150. STAFF OF THE BUREAU OF COMPETITION OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, A
STUDY OF THE COMMISSION’S DIVESTITURE PROCESS 23 (1999) (“mistakes by buyers are
inherent in the acquisition process, particularly where buyers have no previous experience in
the market.”).
151. 2011 Policy Guide to Merger Remedies, supra note 143, at 8 (“The Federal Trade
Commission Divestiture Study found that divestitures of on-going businesses succeeded at a
higher rate than divestitures of selected assets.”) (footnote omitted).
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the deal. This is not a geographic expansion merger involving a handful of
152
competitive overlaps, as was the case with prior wireless mergers. As
previously stated, the relevant geographic market in this case appears
national. But even on a local market basis, there are likely to be hundreds
of local markets where AT&T and T-Mobile compete for customers, and
where both are among the top four competitors. If DOJ finds likely
competitive effects in all or most of those local markets, divestiture
becomes an unattractive remedy.
Second is the question of the identity of the buyer. The goal is to have
a buyer (or buyers) that will restore the competition lost by the
disappearance of T-Mobile. A large buyer like Sprint would be one option,
but only in those markets where it does not have a sizeable presence
already. Otherwise, even with a divestiture, the number of players is being
reduced postmerger.
A small buyer may be unattractive, since it may be unable to deliver
what T-Mobile did for its customers. For example, a small carrier may
depend more on its larger rivals than T-Mobile does. And that could end up
meaning it has a higher cost structure, or is dependent on its competitors, in
ways that T-Mobile is not.
Third is the question of what assets are being divested. The answer
has to be primarily licenses for spectrum. And here we run into another
problem. If, AT&T asserts it needs T-Mobile’s spectrum, what are the
merging parties going to divest? Spectrum. But since spectrum is the driver
of the deal, it does not make sense that AT&T will simply sell off TMobile’s spectrum everywhere that there is overlap. Rather, the likely
153
result would be “mix and match” divestitures. AT&T will be willing to
divest the spectrum that it does not need, but keep the spectrum that it
needs or is more desirable. We have seen something similar happen in
radio mergers, where the merged company keeps the bigger stations and
agrees to divest the smaller ones. AT&T’s antitrust counsel would likely
offer the same deal. Of course, it may happen by chance that a buyer needs
precisely the same spectrum that AT&T is willing to divest, but that is

152. The four current nationwide facilities-based mobile telephone providers largely
built their nationwide footprints through various mergers and acquisitions. A number of the
more recent acquisitions are described in the FCC’s Thirteenth Mobile Wireless
Competition Report. Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993, Thirteenth Report, 24 F.C.C.R. 6185, paras. 52–62, (WTB
2009), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-09-54A1.pdf.
153. A “mix and match” divestiture is one that includes some of the acquiring firm’s
assets and some of the acquired firm’s assets. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions about
Merger Consent Order Provisions, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, http://www.ftc.gov/bc/
mergerfaq.shtm (last visited Nov. 15, 2011).
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unlikely to happen. A profit-maximizing firm does not pay thirty-nine
billion dollars in order to sell competitors the best spectrum.
So what is the argument in favor of divestitures? In the larger or urban
geographic markets in which the merging parties compete, AT&T will
likely argue that it need not divest anything. Those are the local markets
where its needs are most acute. It will undoubtedly argue that these are also
the markets that have the most provider choices, and also that T-Mobile is
not much of a competitive factor, especially in the 4G future.
In the smaller or rural overlap markets, where there is less choice,
AT&T probably would be willing to divest. Indeed, its likely endgame is to
limit its divestitures just to those markets. Why? That solves a couple of the
problems mentioned above. First, it means that the divestitures become a
much smaller part of the overall deal. Second, it means that buyers can
probably be found and approved. Third, the buyer will likely not pose a
significant competitive threat to AT&T nationwide postmerger.
During the DOJ investigation, the merging parties’ endgame most
likely was to keep the DOJ focused on narrowly-defined geographic
markets, progressively attempting to whittle down the number of
geographic markets where DOJ had concerns. By compartmentalizing the
merger into small regions, AT&T and T-Mobile could hope to horse trade
with DOJ on the divesture of assets in smaller markets like Knoxville,
Tennessee. There is nothing sinister with this strategy; indeed, it happens
regularly at the agencies. While we were at DOJ in the 1990s–2000s, we
154
and bank mergers.155 In
saw this piecemeal approach for radio
retrospect, it is questionable whether these piecemeal divestitures in
consent decrees actually restored the competition lost by the mergers and
prevented the risks from the trend toward consolidation.
Now that DOJ and the states have filed suit, AT&T and T-Mobile are
likely to follow a similar strategy in any settlement offer they make.
However, this strategy is made more difficult by the fact that a complaint
has been filed. Any settlement must remedy the competitive harms alleged
in the complaint. Because the complaint has alleged harm to numerous
local markets (including some very large local markets) as well as national
effects from the merger, a small number of localized divestitures would be
inadequate to remedy the alleged harm to competition.

154. See Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Why More Antitrust Immunity for the
Media is a Bad Idea, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 115, 128–30 (2010) (citing Joel I.
Klein, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Dept. of Just., Speech at the ANA Hotel: DOJ Analysis
of Radio Mergers (Feb. 1997)), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1710466.
155. See Maurice E. Stucke, Lessons from the Financial Crisis, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 313
(2010).
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Enjoining the Merger

This brings us to the last remedy: blocking the merger. Actually,
according to the Supreme Court, that is the first remedy courts are
supposed to consider. On the question of remedies, United States v. E. I.
Du Pont De Nemours & Co., which is still good law, states:
The very words of § 7 suggest that an undoing of the acquisition is a
natural remedy. Divestiture or dissolution has traditionally been the
remedy for Sherman Act violations whose heart is intercorporate
combination and control, and it is reasonable to think immediately of
the same remedy when § 7 of the Clayton Act, which particularizes the
Sherman Act standard of illegality, is involved. Of the very few
litigated § 7 cases which have been reported, most decreed divestiture
as a matter of course. Divestiture has been called the most important of
antitrust remedies. It is simple, relatively easy to administer, and sure.
It should always be in the forefront of a court’s mind when a violation
156
of § 7 has been found.

Given the unattractiveness of behavioral remedies and the likely
inadequacy of piecemeal divestitures, the preferred remedy seems clear.

VI. CONCLUSION
The AT&T/T-Mobile merger is presumptively anticompetitive under
Philadelphia National Bank. There are important policy reasons for this
legal presumption, including providing greater certainty to consumers and
the industry participants, increasing transparency and accountability of the
antitrust agencies, and reducing the risk of political capture of the
157
Here on a national level, this is a four to three merger in a
agencies.
highly concentrated industry. The industry, through past mergers, has
accelerated toward greater concentration. The industry has high entry
barriers. There is no indication that the market shares overstate competitive
significance.
The merging parties must provide convincing evidence to overcome
the presumption. To date, they have not. AT&T and T-Mobile have not
established why the market is not susceptible to coordinated effects. There
is also reason to believe that AT&T could unilaterally raise prices to TMobile’s customers postmerger. At the end of the day, the proposed merger
likely violates Section 7 of the Clayton Act and should be enjoined.

156. United States v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 329–31
(footnotes omitted). Note that DuPont uses the word “divestiture” to mean complete
divestiture (i.e., preventing an acquisition), not divestiture of some assets.
157. These policy reasons are elaborated in Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of
Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1375 (2009).
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